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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.
App. Ct. No. 20070863-CA
WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ, ;
Defendant/Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of DUI, a thirddegree felony in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-502 (1953) as amended. The
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the DUI and a no insurance1 charge on
October 9, 2007. The plea was entered pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah Ct.App.1988), preserving the right to appeal the single issue of this
appeal. The Defendant was sentenced to a term of 0-5 years at the Utah State
Prison. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a~3(e).

The Defendant does not challenge the no insurance conviction.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN PURSUANT TO A
TELEPHONIC WARRANT THAT Dlb NOT COMPLY
WITH RULE 40 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court Ireviews "search and seizure
issues for correctness", based on an examination of the totality of the
circumstances. The appellate court applies no deference to the district court's
legal conclusions. {State v. Naranjo, 118 P.3d 285p 288, (Utah Ct. App. 2005)
and State v. Rynhart, 125 P.3d 938, 941, (Utah 200$)).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly
preserved for appeal by the timely filing of a motion to suppress and the
hearing thereon. (R. 17).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons] houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to Ibe searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 40. Search Warrants.

See Addendum A.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol
concentration.
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the
time of operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of

Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i)
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions
of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged with a violation of one count of DUI, a
third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-502 (1953) as amended,
together with several misdemeanors that were resolved by plea negotiation.
The Defendant filed a timely motion to suppress the toxicology results from
blood drawn pursuant to a telephonic warrant. After an evidentiary hearing and
arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the
Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to State v. Seiy, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah Ct.App.1988). The Defendant was sentenced on October 9, 2007 to a
term of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. The amended Sentence, Judgment
and Commitment was entered on October 11, 2007. (R. 39) On October 18,
2007, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. (R. 42).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 3, 2007, Officer Chris Turley pulled over the Defendant for
DUI. At that time the Defendant refused to take an intoxylizer test. Officer
Turley then filled out an affidavit and application for a search warrant and
made telephonic contact with Judge W. Brent West of the Second Judicial
District Court. (R. 51/2-3) The relevant portions of the affidavit were read to
Judge West by Officer Turley, who had been placed under oath. Pursuant to
verbal instruction by Judge West, Officer Turley signed the Judges name to the
warrant and proceeded to execute the warrant by having medical personnel
draw the defendant's blood. (R. 51/ 3-6)

All parties acknowledge that Judge

West did not file any documents, recordings or other writing with the clerk.
The next day the County Attorney filed the affidavit of Officer Turley and the
Search Warrant signed by Officer Turley for Judge West.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant believes that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the
evidence obtained as a direct result of the search warrant. Rule 40 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the requirements of a telephonic search
warrant. That rule requires a magistrate,
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court
5

files with are secured against access by the public. (Rule 40(i)(l)
emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the magistrate did nothjng to comply with these
requirements. Judge West did not record either by electronic media or by
written notes anything relating to the issuance of the search warrant. Judge
West did not file anything regarding this search warrant in the court records.
This failing, therefore, invalidates the search warrant; and, therefore, any
evidence obtained in reliance on the search warrant should be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN PURSUANT TO A
TELEPHONIC WARRANT THAT DID NOT COMPLY
WITH RULE 40 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
provides in relevant part: "The right of the people \o be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated" The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a
seizure is unreasonable. Additionally, the State of Utah has codified certain
rules in an effort to implement these constitutional guarantees. One of these
statutes is Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant
portion of that statute states:
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At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court
files with are secured against access by the public. (Rule 40(i)(l)
emphasis added)

In the case at bar, the magistrate failed to retain, seal, or file any of the
requisite documents or recordings as set forth in this rule. The trial court in this
case, recognized that failing; however, declined to impose any sanctions for
that violation.
Although the Utah Appellate Courts have not specifically addressed the
issue of a violation of the telephonic search warrant issues as applicable to this
particular case, there is some guidance regarding the importance of following
certain procedures in recording or filing search warrant.
Anderson v, Taylor, 2006 UT 79,^26

In the case of

149 P.3d 352, the Utah Supreme Court

addressed the failure of the Fourth District Court to appropriately file and make j>
available search warrants and affidavits. In that case the Court, recognizing the

The defendant is aware of one case, U.S. v. Larson 63 Fed.Appx. 416, *422,
2003 WL 723961, **5 (C.A.10 (Utah (C.A. 10 (Utah),2003) which is a
unpublished decision wherein the 10th circuit stated that under federal law,
technical violations of the recording requirements of a telephonic search
warrant did not rise to the level of requiring suppression. Additionally there is
a recent Seventh Circuit opinion likewise interpreting the federal rules
differently than state rules. (See U.S. v. Cazares-Olivas 2008 WL 220689, *3
(C.A.7 (Wis. (C.A.7 (Wis.),2008)
7

ex parte nature of these types of proceedings together with the constitutional
implications, stated,
Utah statutes governing the issuance of search warrants
contemplate that the issuing court will maintain reliable records
of the warrants and the documents supporting them. We
accordingly grant in part Anderson's petition for extraordinary
writ and call upon our supervisory power oyer the courts of this
state to require that they retain copies of all warrants issued and
the documents supporting the requests for su^h warrants.

In the present case the trial court failed to follow the statutory mandates
regarding the issuance of a search warrant and the preservation of necessary
records memorializing such an issuance.
Various courts from other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues
involving the issuance of telephonic search warrants. In the case of United
States v. Shorter, 600 F2d 585 (1979, CA6 Ohib), the Court held that the
failure of a federal magistrate to properly administer an oath before receiving
information on a telephonic search warrant required suppression of the
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Similarly, in the case of Bowyer v.
Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 37 Cal App 3d 151 (1974, 1st Dist) the
court held that narcotics seized by police pursuant to a telephonic search
warrant should be suppressed where the warrant w^s invalid because it had not
been placed in writing in any form in contravention 0f California state laws.
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In the case of State v. Boniface, 546 P.2d 843, (Arizona 1976), the
reviewing court ruled that a warrant was invalid where the statement of an
officer had not been taken under oath nor recorded by the magistrate as
required by law. Furthermore, in the case of State v. Cook, 498 N.W. 2d 17, 20
(Minn. 1993), the court held, "serious violations which subvert the purpose of
established procedure will justify suppression."

In that case, which is

strikingly similar to the case at bar, the court suppressed evidence seized
pursuant to the telephonic search warrant due to statutory violations by the
magistrate regarding the recordation of the call used to obtain a search warrant.
According to Minnesota law, the entire call from which a search warrant is
issued must be recorded "either by a voice recording, stenography, or
longhand" (Id. at 19-20)
Likewise, in the case of State v. Reep, 167 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Wash.
2007), the Court reversed a conviction and suppressed evidence obtained from
a search warrant where the officer properly wrote out the script for his
telephonic application, but the magistrate failed to make a recording of that
conversation, and had no recollection of the conversation thereby making
appellate review impossible.
In the case of Volz v. State 773 N.E. 2d 894 (Ind. App. 2002), the court
suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant where

9

the officer failed to make a complete recording of |the conversation as required
by statute. According that case further rejected tljie State's argument that the
good-faith exception should apply.
The State may argue that a good-faith exception should apply or that the
suppression of evidence is unduly harsh for what (seems to be a minor failure
by the issuing magistrate. Minor failings, however, can result in significant
and permanent ramifications in all areas of law. For instance, if a criminal
defendant fails to file a notice of appeal until 31 days after the entry of the
judgment, he is barred from proceeding on an appeal. In a juvenile court
setting, if a parent fails to sign a notice of appeal of a judgment terminating her
parental rights (which has been signed by her counsel), she is barred from
proceeding on an appeal of that very significant an$ permanent loss. Similarly,
one day may make the difference between wheth0r a case may be filed or is
barred by statute of limitations, one day may m^ke the difference between
whether requests for admissions in the civil realm $re deemed admitted or can
be answered in denied. Furthermore, five inche$ may make the difference
between whether a distribution of controlled substance is deemed a first-degree
felony (within 1000 feet of a drug free zone) or a (second-degree felony. The
examples are almost endless.

Due process and equal protection should

mandate that if a criminal defendant can be incarcdrated for minor differences
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or violations, the very court which incarcerates the individual should be
required to strictly follow codified law with regards to the issuance of
telephonic search warrants.
The state cannot argue that the error was harmless on the grounds that
the officer would have had exigent circumstances which would have allowed
the blood draw without a warrant. This is contradicted on two grounds. First
the officer obviously did not believe that the circumstances were exigent
enough to allow a warrantless search; otherwise he would not have requested
the warrant. Secondly, the court in State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^f 31, 156
P3d. 771 has held, "the evanescence of blood-alcohol was never special
enough to create an exigent circumstance of itself"
Once this Court has established that there was a statutory or
constitutionally impermissible search and seizure of the Defendant's blood,
State and Federal caselaw require the suppression of the tainted evidence. In
the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S.
Supreme Court stated, "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from
trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of
an unlawful invasion." The Court further reinforced the gravity of Fourth
Amendment protections in the home by stating,
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person,
11

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Cckirt held nearly half a
century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could
not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383. The exclusionary prohibition extends
as well to the indirect as the direct produqts of such invasions.
(Wong Sun v. United States, at 484).
The Utah Courts have likewise followed th0 fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App.
1998) this Court held:
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule Mapp requires us to
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U S . at 655, 81 S.Ct. at
1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie
Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there
any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officers impermissibly
seized the Defendant's blood when they relied on a search warrant that was
improperly issued by the magistrate.

The magistrate did not record the

conversation by electronic or written means. The judge did not file any
document, recording or other evidence of the issuance of the search warrant.
These requirements are statutory, and the failing to| follow the statute violated
the Defendant's due process constitutional rights. Once that seizure occurred,
any evidence obtained should be suppressed as a violation of the Defendant's
constitutional rights under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In the
12

present case, that suppression should include all evidence obtained from a
subsequent blood draw from the Defendant. This evidence obtained by the
improper issuance of the warrant would therefore constitute fruit of the
poisonous tree.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial courts decision denying the Defendant's motion to
suppress evidence on the grounds of an illegal search and jsemjre.
/

th

DATED this 25 day of February 2008.

)ALLW\RICHARUS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Ryan Tenney, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East
300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, JJtah 84114-0180,
postage prepaid this 25l day of February 2008

RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM A

14

Rule 40* Search Warrants
(a) Definitions.
As used in this rule:
(a)(l)"Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m. local
time.
(a)(2)"Recorded "or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony, a
return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other replication
that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same effect as the
original.
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the state
and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, or
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as
the original.
(b) Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is
probable cause to believe it:
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or
conceal the commission of an offense; or
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
(c) Conditions precedent to issuance.
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized.
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena,
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought
by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the magistrate

shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford protection of
the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence:
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business;
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential sources
of information; or
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints oi|i constitutionally protected
rights.
(d) Search warrant served in readable form.
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readabje form upon the person or
place to be searched.
(e) Time for service — Officer may request assistance.
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the wartant that it be served in the
daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to its being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case the
magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any tiifte of the day or night.
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance.
Any search warrant not executed within this time styall be void and shall be
returned to the court or magistrate as not executed.
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search.
(f) Receipt for property taken.
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search Warrant, shall give a receipt
to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no
person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in thp place where the property
was found.
(g) Return — Inventory of property taken.
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return of
the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is) being held.
(h) Safekeeping of property.
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible] for its safekeeping and
maintenance until the court otherwise orders.

(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies - Documents sealed for twenty days Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction.
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed search
warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public.
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by:
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and filing
the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public;
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control of
the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in
which they are sealed; or
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the State
of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the documents to
the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after issuance of the
warrant by the magistrate.
(j) Findings required for service without notice.If the magistrate finds upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given, the
magistrate may direct that the officer need not give notice of authority and purpose
before entering the premises to be searched.
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances —
Warrant to obtain evidence.
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a showing of
probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has been
violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a
warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be
obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed to
any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who shall
serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer.

(1) Remotely communicated search warrants.
(1)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable Under the circumstances, a
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who is
not in the physical presence of the magistrate, providea the magistrate is satisfied
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All communication
between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting attorney requesting the
warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text, or any combination of
those, or by other means.
(1)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony toon which the magistrate
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The testimony
and content of the warrant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by writing or by
mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage <br by other means.
(1)(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the magistrate
shall issue a search warrant.
(1)(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace officer
or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a (remote location to sign the
magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location.
(1)(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony shall be
retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be by
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other
means.
(1)(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m) of
this rule, any person having standing may request ana shall be provided with a
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable
form.
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Document^
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of
good cause, the court may order the following document? to be sealed:
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants;
(m)(l)(B) search warrants;

(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant is
based;
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for
sealing the documents.
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are public
record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public file if
all or part of the information in them would:
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety;
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's reputation
or privacy; or
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation.
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is
accompanied by a court order sealing the document.
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion to
unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed,
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without
the authorization of the court.
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may remain
sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be unsealed.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES

OCT 1 I 200?

vs

Case No: 071901654 FS

WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
October 9, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 20, 1982
Video
Tape Number:
3C100907
Tape Count: 232-237
CHARGES
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2007 Guilty
4. NO PROOF OF INSURANCE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2007 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for plea. Defendant is present in custody
from the Utah State Prison. Defendant is represented by Martin
Gravis. Negotiations have been reached.
The State moves to dismiss counts 2, 3 and 5. Court grants.
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a full Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.
The Court advises defendant of rights. Defendant enters a plea of
guilty as charged to counts 1 and 4.
The Court accepts plea, finds that it is knowingly and voluntarily
Page 1

Case No: 071901654
Date:
Oct 09, 2007
given and there is a factual basis for the charge. The defendant
waives time for sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court orders sentence imposed on each count to run concurrent
with each other but consecutive to sentence defendant is currently
serving. Jail sentence shall be served at the Utah State Prison.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of NO PROOF OF INSURANCE a
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180
day(s)
Dated this

day of

QC1

" ) / ^l07

^20

PAMELA <#? ^FFERNAN
District Court Judge
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Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan presiding,
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Ogden, Utah
September 18, 2007

13
\i'
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25
i

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is State of Utah versus

William Dominguez, 071901654.
MR. SHAW:

Go ahead, Mr. Shaw.

We call Trooper Turley to the stand.
CHRIS TURLEY,

being first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:
Q.

Trooper, please state your full name and occupation.

A.

Chris Turley.

I!m a state trooper with the Utah

Highway Patrol.
Q.

And how long have you been so employed?

A.

Umm, a little over two years now.

Q,

Did you have occasion to come into contact with the

defendant, William Thomas Dominguez, on June 3rd of 2007?
MR. GRAVIS:

We'll stipulate to that, Your Honor.

We'll stipulate that he arrested him for a DUI.
MR. SHAW:
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.
I don't think we need to go through all

that.
MR. SHAW:
the search warrant.

Okay.

We'll get right to the issue of

There came a time during the course of

the arrest where Mr. Dominguez refused to take an intoxylizer
test, or other chemical test; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.
2

Q,

And what did you do in response
At that time I wrote a search warrant.

I contacted

Judge West by .telephone,
£

jid when you say you wrote a search warrant, did you

write the warrant prior to contacting -- an affidavit for the
1

warrant prior to contacting Judge West?
A.

That's correct.

Q,

And where did you do that?

A.

At my office.

C

he defendant, then, was still with you and

present at the time you were preparing the warrar. • :).r
affidavit for warrant?
A.

Yes.

He was under supervision a* -1 •

MR. S H A W :

Your Honor, we have

"- • ,
suppose there'L

a stipulation that the affidavit is acci irate as reflected j :i.
the memorandum?
MR. GRAVIS:. I stipulate that t-hat's the affidavit
'. e officer prepared, but not that that's what was told to
Judge West.
Bil, SHAW;
fc.

Okay .

That! s fine .

(Bl MR. SHAW) So you prepared an affidavit and you

contacted Judge West telephonically?
Correct.
Tell us about the telephone conversation.
you inform Judge West of during

4

L

What did

Ul-phone conversation?
o

A.

I informed him of the subject's name, the reason for

the stop, all of the clues I observed as far as his red blood
shot eyes, the smell of the odor of alcohol, the subject!s
unwillingness to submit to a chemical test.
Q.

Do you have a copy of the affidavit for search

warrant?
A.

I do.

Q.

Look at that with me, if you will.

Let's just go

through it if we night for a moment line item by line item.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, we'll submit that the

affidavit can be entered so we don't have to go through all
of it.

If the state wants to submit the affidavit, it speaks

for itself.
MR. SHAW:
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.
At least the alleged affidavit, let's

make it that way.
MR. SHAW:

Okay.

That's fine.

Q. (BY MR. SHAW) What I'm getting at, trooper, is did
you in fact read part or all of this affidavit to Judge West
while you had him on the telephone?
A.

Umm, I did not read him every line of this affidavit.

I stated the facts to him.

I did state all of the facts that

23 I are in this affidavit as far as the reason for the stop, the
24
25

reason for wanting to obtain a warrant.
Q.

Are you able, looking at the affidavit, to tell us
4

]

2
3
A

5
6

v1 lat

if any, part of the affidavit was read specifically to

the judge on the telephone?
A.

Umm, I read him the reason for the stop, which is oh

l.he first page at the bottom.
Q.

Starting with on June 3rd, 2007, at approximately

1:02 ] lours?

7

A

8

Q

9

A

Correct.

Continuing all the way through where I requested

iorainguez's blood to a portable blood tester and he refused.
I also informed him that Dominguez had at least four prior
?ictions in the past ten years.

And that he was on

parole for a felony DUI conviction.
Q,

14

l,u) , And then, prior to you reading that portion of

::he affidavit or going through that information with Judge
we---1

were you placed under oath by Judge West?
A.

I was.

Q.

Okay.

And at the conclusion of the affidavit, or at

least your statement to the judge, which included part of the
affidavit, what did Judge West direct you to do?
21

A.

2°

affidavit.

23

Q.

2/1

2 5

Umm, he advised me to affix a signature to the

And was that done in accordance with the judge's

order at 0227 hours?
A.

It was.

Q.

Okay.

And then did you sign the affidavit prior to

Judge West directing you to sign his name?
A.

I did not.

Q.

When did you sign the affidavit?

A.

When he told me to.

Q.

Okay.

That's what I'm saying, when he told you to

sign it you went ahead and signed the affidavit?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

In its current form?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And then looking at the search warrant, did you also

affix Judge West's name to that search warrant at 0227•hours?
A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

And then ultimately there is a return on the

warrant wherein you returned the warrant.

And it was

subsequently signed, it looks like, June 4th, 2007, by Judge
Jones?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Was there any other attempt to make a record of the

20

telephone conference between yourself and Judge West during

21

this entire process?

22

A.

No.

23

MS. HUGIE:

24

MR. GRAVIS:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's all.

I have no questions.
You may step down.

Thank you.

Any
1
6

1

further witnesses?

2

1

3

THE COURT:

4

I

No, that's all the witnesses we have.
Go ahead if you want to argue, i \ .
r

our Honor, I think the argument that we

5 . nade is straightforward in the memorandum.
i

Rule 40(1)

:.-.:.• i.it modified the previous statute as I read it and

7

defines recording to include a written record of the

8

conversation.

9

prepared simultaneously with his conversation with Ji ldge

Trooper Turley has a written record that was

1C

AJest.

Mr'"' ,",, testified that he under oath stated those facts

11

contained in that affidavit to Judge West.

1?

\lirec Led hint, upon the conclusion of that, to sign his name

13 1 to the warrant.

Judge West

That warrant was then issued.

I want to be specific about this, because I think rule
15

40(a) (2) defines recorded or recording as including Lln<

16

"recording of testimony, a return or other communication or

17

any copy, printout, facsimile, or other replica":

IP

atended by the person making the recording to have the same
effect as the original."

20
21

is

It's a written document

Trooper

Turl ey followed that document during his conversation.
Then, if you look at rule 40(1) (2), the recording M"

22

testimony is sufficient if in written form.

23

affidavit is.

24

accordance with rule 40 and we think it's a valid warrant.

25

That's what the

It was substantially complied with :i n

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Go ahead.
7

1

MR. GRAVIS:

Well, Your Honor, I agree that rule 40

2

has replaced the statute, but the state is skipping over rule

3

i (1), which says that --

4

THE COURT:

5 I

THE COURT:

7

MR. GRAVIS:

8

THE COURT:

10
11

Hold on a second.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

6

9

Let me get it out.

my office.
to.

And you were looking at what?
40(i)(l).
You know, I guess I have my 2007 book in

I thought I had one out here, but I donf t seem

Why don!t you read it to me.
MR. GRAVIS:

"At the time of issuance, the

12

magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the search

13

warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded

14

testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall, within a

15

reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files

16

which are secured against access by the public.

Those

17 J documents shall remain sealed until 20 days following the
18

issuance of the warrant unless that time is extended or

19

reduced under section M.

20

shall be filed in the court record available to the public."

21

Unsealed search warrant documents

So I submit that rule (i)(1) requires that that record be
There 1 s no

22

prepared by the magistrate, not by the officer.

23

evidence that any recording of the testimony of the officer

24

was made by the magistrate.

25

there was nothing there.

When we tried to obtain a copy

There was no signed copy of the

search warrant, there's no signed --

4

""f'lil". 'VO'lCRT i

There's nothing on file here?

MR. GRAVIS:

Nothing on file other thaji what the

ite has already filed,- which is the warrant signed by the

officer with Judge West ! s signature and the affidavit that he
prepared wi t h i In- officer -So what!s your primary complaint about

THE COURT:
';hi s exactly?
MR. GRAVIS:

There's no affidavit.

There's no ^a^+s

tagistrate can base a search warrant on because
there's no record of that conversation between the officer
irnl JuJi-ic 'w^-st that is required to be made by the magistrate,
not by the officer.
THE COURT:

What's required to be made?

MR. GRAVIS:
1

The record.
. Let's say he came in and brought

a copy of the affidavit in on Monday, or the next ntnrnirg,
whatever the next business days was, do you think that's
sufficient?
F

i

N:>.

It says at the time of issuance.

It clearly says at the time of issuance the magistrate shall,
Mot may, shall.

So the magistrate has to do that at the time

of the issuance of the telephonic warrant or any other
.::ant, he's got to make a signed copy and a copy of the
affidavit.

If there's no affidavit it says or other recorded

testimony.

But it's at the time of the issuance of the

warrant.
THE COURT:

I guess I'm wondering, is it your

J

complaint thLat he di dn't read verbatim the affidavit?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE, COURT:

No.

My point is —

I'm just trying to understand exactly

what you're complaining about.
MR. GRAVIS:

Our complaint is that there's no

evidence to base the search warrant on.

The recording which

is required under the statute has to be) made by the
magistrate and itTs not done here.

So we have -- we don't

know what he told the magistrate because, I submit, the work
product is not good enough.

The law requires that the

magistrate make the recording, not the officer.

I have a

copy of the rule right here in front of me.
THE COURT:

So in other words if he had faxed a copy

of this to him or e-mailed it to him?
MR. GRAVIS:

That might be good enough so the

magistrate could file that at the time of the issuance of the
warrant or have a copy, but he didn't.

There's nothing here

that Judge West retained a copy of any conversation, or even
a copy of the warrant, which the rule specifically requires.
THE COURT:
MR. SHAW:

Do you want to respond?
Yeah.

I think 40 (i) and 40(1) are

mutually exclusive given the change in the law and statute.
10

40(1) was designed for this very purpose of obtaining remote
warrants and not require the kind of thing that Mr. Gravis is
suggesting we have to do.
4 |

The important part. ! ... was Officer Turley sworn under oath

5 | and did he testify accurately as part of that oath and
( I affirmation to obtain the warrant?

I don't read 40 (i) - - I

7 I don't have a copy with me, but I don't read 40 (i) as negating
he content of 40(1), which is very specific about remote
warrants.
'. Ml-1

10 I

MfAV I rl

11 I

THE COURT:

12 | '

MI I

I , iibJiu I. - I'm going t o take i t under

GRA \ > IS

Okay.

THE COURT:
1L

17

I'll get you a decision when I get it

"::: .. I n t h. e m e a n 11 in e, I guess we'll leave the trial date
j set where it's at.

16

I assume the state will proceed on tria]

.-._, regardless of the warrant, or the affidavit or the
test results, the blood sample?

18

i* ,.>iihA,W: 'Yeah.

19

negotiations, though, Your Honor.

20

date.

21-

THE COURT:

22

decision out tc> you.

23

MR. GRAVIS:

24
25

advisement.

It may change our prospects for

All right.

It could negate the trial

I'll do my best to get a

I have other things on the table also.
We have a pretrial scheduled

hi two

weeks.
THE COURT

should have it by then.
11

MR. SHAW:

Does it show a nonjury trial setting?

THE COURT:

No, a jury setting.- All right.

Thank

you.
MR. GRAVIS:
MR. SHAW:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I received a telephone call

from the toxicologist who will be out of the country from
October 1st through October 19th, which is right when this
trial is set.

I would ask that we strike that date.

MR. GRAVIS:
see what happens.

Just leave it until the pretrial and

I don't have any problem if we strike the

trial date at the time of the pretrial.
MR. SHAW:

Should we strike the trial and set it for

a review pending your decision?
MR. GRAVIS:

I'd like to leave it where it is.

If

we win and they want to proceed to trial, I don't want to
have to wait for a new trial date.

They won't need the

toxicologist -MR. SHAW:

If in fact we lose we won't need the

toxicologist.
THE COURT:

I've got another jury trial starting

that Wednesday with another person named Dominguez.

I don't

know who it is, but it's obviously not this person.

But it

may be bumped anyway.

Let's just leave it alone for now and

I'll get a decision out.

Thanks.

(Hearing concluded.)
12
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5 I
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9 I
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